T o international companies, there is something both inevitable and desirable about the trend towards globalization of the sales function, usually referred to as global account management. It is inevitable because major business customers are generally well down the road to globalization in supply chain management, and from their major suppliers worldwide they increasingly demand contracts with standardized terms in areas such as product specification, price, and service standards. It is desirable because the institution of global customer management is in line with trends like customer relationship management and building customer-centric organizations, ideas which currently hold much sway with top executives in many multinational corporations.
However, vendor companies should think carefully before jumping on the global customer bandwagon. Such relationships can turn out to be quite different from expectations. In many cases, vendors find that the unanticipated costs outweigh the benefits. Over the last two years, we have conducted field research into global account management from the vendor's perspective in Europe and North America. In over half the corporations, we found management struggling to figure out how to make this system work. In many cases, the major change that resulted from classifying a customer as a global account was increased downward pressure on prices. This was because consolidated sales triggered requests for greater volume discounts and because the reliance of the vendor on the account became more salient. In addition, many vendor companies were paying increased sales commissions, since now both global account teams and local sales teams were involved in sales. Furthermore, top sales executives had to accept lower standards of account management than they previously had from their national accounts. Not one of the companies we researched, for
Implementing Global Account Management: Two Cautionary Tales
• Whitegoods Corporation is a European manufacturing company that designated a number of global account managers in response to the centralized purchasing demands of major retail customers.These individuals negotiated the whole package with their customers-product specifications, prices, and even local installation and service agreements. Unfortunately, Whftegoods Corp.'s sales organization was still managed on a country-bycountry basis. Local sales people prioritized the higher-margin business they got through local customers. Some disregarded the frame agreement altogether; with the result that global account managers found themselves "policing" the deal. In a few countries, local sales managers were not even informed about the global accounts and only found out about them via their customers.The result was delays and disagreements on local installation and a soured relationship between national sales managers and global account managers. Prices were squeezed down as a result of the global agreement, but the projected sales volume increases did not materialize.
• Computer Corporation, a U.S.-based manufacturer; had negotiated a similar agr^eement with a major global account in the financial services sectonThe German subsidiary of that customer approached Computer Corp.'s German subsidiary for quotes on a major order for 500 workstations that the firm required as it switched its European headquarters from London to Frankfurt. It wanted a price below the minimum specified in the global agreement, arguing that extra volume discounts were appropriate since the order was large, non-recurring, and all intended for local German offices. Computer Corp.'s German subsidiary, a profit center with much to gain from accepting the order in what was proving to be a difficult recessionary year in Germany, eventually succumbed to the temptation and accepted the order It proved to be less substantive than promised, with only 100 units being purchased, a good number of which it suspected were ne-exported to Eastern Europe.The global agreement, meanwhile, had fallen apart when other subsidiaries of the customer got word of the lower price obtained in Germany example, had developed a system for measuring account profitability on a global scale. This article reports on a two-year research project examining the approaches taken by sixteen large multinational companies in developing global account management structures.' Strategy and implementation are the key areas where international companies need to make some tough decisions before entering global account relationships. Companies need to be aware of the pitfalls and set themselves clear criteria for their relationships before commitments are made. If these steps are taken, then the rewards of global relationships with customers can be substantial. If not, the relationship can become imbalancedand in these cases it is almost always the buyer who benefits at the expense of the vendor. 
Overview of the Research
The research was conducted in two stages. Stage one involved face-toface interviews with 35 managers in ten companies-typically a mixture of global account managers, national sales managers, and executives responsible for overseeing global account organizations. Stage two involved sending questionnaires to the same three groups of people in sixteen companies, resulting in 107 completed questionnaires from global account managers, 55 from national sales managers, and 10 from executives responsible for overseeing the global account organization in their company. The perspectives of the national sales managers provide for a comparison between global accounts and non-global accounts.Î nformation provided by the global account managers showed that sales to their global account had grown strongly (average 10-15% per year) but that the average price of goods sold to that account had gone down slightly (see Table 1 ). In terms of how the accounts were organized, the typical model was that certain key decisions, including pricing, became the primary responsibility Can Selling Be Globalized? The Pitfalls of Global Account Managennent of the global account manager. However, most local sales and service activity continued to be managed at the local level.
The 55 national sales managers surveyed are the individuals ultimately responsible for all sales in their national market, including those that go through global accounts. They were divided into three groups, according to the importance of global accounts in their national market. The first group had less than 20% of their sales made through global accounts, so we designated them as "Non Global." The second group had between 20% and 50% of their sales made through global accounts so we called them "Mixed." The final group we called "Global" because over 50% of their sales were made through global accounts. There were similar numbers of respondents in each group.
Upon comparing these three groups, some interesting patterns emerged (see Table 2 ). Sales growth was similar in all three, typically around 15% per year. However, in terms of the price of goods sold, the Global group experienced "much lower" or "slightly lower" prices, whereas the Non-Global group indicated "no change" in prices. In other words, the price erosion appeared to be significantly worse in the global accounts than in the non-global accounts. In terms of where responsibilities lay for various activities, pricing decisions were made on a more central basis in the Global group, while sales and service activities were undertaken on a more local basis in the Non-Global group. These findings suggest that global accounts represent a centralization of certain activities, often as a result of the demands of the customer, that results in a similar overall level of sales growth but a downward pressure on prices.
Strategy-Selecting and Designing Global Account Relationships
The key strategic questions facing the vendor company are whether to create global accounts at all and, if the decision is made to do so, which customer relationships should be selected. While these decisions are to some degree dictated by the preferences of customers, vendor companies should take a highly selective approach to the introduction of global account structures, since such relationships are inherently dangerous. In selecting the right customers to designate as global accounts, the two most important criteria are the balance of power in the relationship and the potential for strategic synergies.
Assess the Balance of Power
A professional buyer looking for standard worldwide pricing is, of course, looking for the lowest price to be applied everywhere. Beyond this, a customer consolidating purchases from several countries will, reasonably, expect volume discounts against previously prevailing prices. In most companies, the purchasing function is considerably more globally coordinated than the sales function, since it shows greater return to scale than the more execution-sensitive function 
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• Note that on the latter three questions, the Global group number is significantly different to the Mixed and Non-Global group.
of managing customer relationships. It is not surprising, then, that so many global account relationships favor the customer at the expense of the vendor. The key determinant of the balance of power in global account negotiations is the degree of internal coordination in each of the partners. In many cases, for example, companies admitted to us that they simply did not have the systems to calculate worldwide sales to a given customer. In some countries, sales went through distributors and could not be tracked by end customer. In others, sales to an affiliate or partner or subsidiary of a customer were not tracked as part of the same account.
If the customer is more globally coordinated than the vendor, then pressure for price cuts will soon surface, resulting in a "price squeeze" (see Figure 1 ). For example, one company's advertising agency had managed to identify all Can Selling Be Globalized? The Pitfails of Global Account Management advertising expenditures worldwide with the titles and channels belonging to one of the largest global media groups. The fragmentation typical of these media groups meant that they were surprised by the information and unable to resist the demand for lower prices on the basis of global volume.
The other problem that surfaces when working with a more global customer is that the company can end up servicing agreements in countries where it has no presence. Imagine the surprise of one vendor we interviewed when he received a call demanding service from a global account at a customer's plant in Indonesia. The vendor had no sales or service organization in that country nor did he realize that the customer was using products there, because they were sold to the Singapore buying office and then shipped on to the factory in Indonesia. Rather than antagonize the customer, this vendor flew someone out from a neighboring country, but it was an expensive solution to a problem that probably should have been foreseen.
Clearly, this scenario does not guarantee that the vendor will face a price squeeze. Many far-sighted customers will choose to build a win-win relationship with their vendors rather than squeeze them on price in the short-term. Furthermore, some vendors are skillful at increasing their power over their customers in other ways. However, if the vendor is "under-globalized" in relation to the customer, the vendor will be in a rather vulnerable position.
The extent to which the vendor is at risk of this opportunistic behavior on the part of the customer in part depends on the initial objective of the global account. When the objective of the account is to increase sales or prevent pricing arbitrage, prices on average decrease; whereas when the initial objective relates to joint innovation with the customer, prices actually increase. As such, the issue of balance of power between the two partners is of particular importance in the case of efficiency-based relationships, while it may be offset by the long-term benefits associated with partnering for new product development. On average, however, the sales-efficiency objectives tend to dominate. In these situations, the best approach is to improve the international coordination of the vendor's sales and support organization, rather than rely on enlightened and far-sighted customers.
If the vendor is more coordinated than the customer, the prospect of a global account relationship might look more attractive. However, this imbalance will imperil the partnership in another way, something we describe as a "hollow agreement." The customer's corporate procurement executives will negotiate a global agreement even though the company is not globalized enough to make local procurement executives comply with the agreement. The result is an agreement that exists in name only. The standardized products and service agreements are unlikely to take hold in the customer organization. Local buyers, without any incentive to switch suppliers, will continue to use their own local sources. Some will see this as a turf issue, resenting the imposition of terms agreed by corporate executives. The customer, in other words, cannot deliver. Meanwhile, of course, the cost of serving the account has increased because of the addition of the global account organization. As shown by the performance data of the relationships in each of the three global account boxes in Eigure 1, the "Global Eit" box is the best performer, followed by the "Hollow Agreement" box, and finally the "Price Squeeze" box.
Assess the Customer as a Strategic Partner, Not Just a Sales Account
In our field research, the more successful global account relationships were almost all ones that had been initiated by the vendor for strategic reasons.
Their motivation for doing so, of course, was to increase their share of the customer's husiness, either through guaranteed minimum levels of husiness or through account penetration in country-markets where the share of the customer's husiness had been low hecause of local factors. However, this objective only proved achievahle if there was a strategic logic behind the partnership, such as the development of innovative or customized offerings that benefited both parties. For example, 3M actively targets key customers in the electronics sector as partners in its product development initiatives. The targeted customers must not only pass the husiness volume criterion, but must be judged to have resources or competencies from which 3M will henefit in the product development process. In return, the customer benefits from involvement in a relevant R&D project that will deliver customized (and in some cases exclusive) new products. Another example is Electrolux's commercial refrigeration business, which has strategic partnering relationships with Shell and other hig oil companies on a global basis. For Shell, an important part of their glohal strategy is a common Retail Visual Identity (RVI), which means that the gas station forecourt and shop look the same everywhere. Electrolux is working on a range of large commercial refrigerators that fit Shell's RVI, which pushes their product development further at the same time.
The reasons to push for a strategic relationship are clear. As noted earlier, if the relationship has no rationale other than sales, then the negotiations will center on price and the globalization of the relationship will result in pressure for volume discounts. The broadening of the relationship to include strategic development projects-such as new product development or customized service agreements-is the only way to make glohal accounts pay for the vendor.
Vendors should assess the strategic potential of customers as global partners. Such relationships need to operate well on three different levels. If any of these is missing, prohlems are likely to emerge.'
• Strategic Importance-Does this relationship really matter to you? Does it matter to your customer? There are two important measures of importance. The first, familiar to all experienced sales executives, is the share of business accounted for by the relationship: Do we have over half of the customer's purchases in this category? If a customer huys less than half their supplies from us and still asks to be a global account, it is likely to be a price squeeze they have in mind? Second, is the customer a lead user of our products? This is the rationale hehind 3M's approach. Any supplier should be in a closer learning relationship with its lead users, even if the sales volumes do not make this customer the largest.
• Marketing and Sales Strategy-Glohal account relationships cannot work unless both partners are committed to global marketing. While this may seem a statement of the ohvious, in many cases there is a serious mismatch between vendor and customer on the extent to which global consistency is part of the marketing strategy. For example, British Telecom has huilt a series of alliances and joint ventures around Europe in order to offer "one-stop shopping" to its international business customers. However, the reality of managing a portfolio of alliances, each with its own local partners, is that their approach varies from country to country. As a result, BT cannot yet offer the standardized solutions its business customers would like. Clearly, global account management does not require that everything is centralized, but it is important that there is a compelling demand for a consistent worldwide platform for the agreement. The extent to which the customer's local marketing units are free to adapt marketing mix elements, especially products, is a good predictor of their attachment to localized purchasing.
• Top Executive Support-^At what level in your organization, and in your customer's organization, does the account relationship exist? As with any sort of key account, the relationship shifts from price negotiations to strategic issues as you move through the customer's hierarchy. So catching the eye of the VP of supply chain management (or similar position) is important. Equally critical is executive support on the vendor side as a means of increasing the legitimacy of the program in both the vendor and customer organizations. For example, a manager in Hewlett-Packard's test and measurement organization (now Agilent) was frustrated that one of the organization's largest accounts was being managed in what he termed a "transactional" way. He was pushing to make it a strategic account, but he acknowledged that the existing account manager-a great sales manager but not a strategic thinker-was the wrong person to take it to that level. What this account needed, and what the most successful cases in our study already had in place, was ownership at a senior level. Global account executives are assigned as mentors to the global account managers, and these individuals can get together with their counterparts in the customer organization to explore opportunities for long-term collaboration.
Implementation-Putting the Right Systems and People in Place
Another big challenge with global accounts involves effective implementation. The sales function has traditionally been a local responsibiUty-even in the largest multinationals-^because it was regarded as execution-sensitive and not susceptible to the economies of scale and control that have motivated globalization in other functions of the business. Global account management, in effect, turns this rationale upside down. Most of the corporations in our study showed signs of tension over who "owns" the customer. In fact, the major problem we encountered in all our research was the conflict between the newly instituted international customer management organization, usually a corporate unit with global responsibility, and the management of a national subsidiary. Country managers are generally measured on sales revenues, and the removal of responsibility for a major customer is therefore a tangible loss. In some cases, country managers were compensated for sales to the global account originating in their country even if they played no part in the sale. However, the glohal account team also needed compensating, of course, and in many cases the vendor organization resigned itself to double-counting orders for the purposes of compensation.
The situation is made more complex by the fact that country management involvement is still necessary in managing such a customer. Delivery and after-sales service have to he managed locally. In addition, managers assigned to the global account team are often located in the field, not in corporate units, because their location is determined by the customer organization rather than by their own. For the purposes of much day-to-day management-such as expense management, office services, and human resource issues-they are regarded as part of the national subsidiary organization.
How do you avoid these sorts of implementation problems? There is no silver bullet here, because as one executive noted, "There is a constant tug between global management and country management that cannot he solved. You just have to manage it." Managing the tension means a lot of hard work building up the necessary capahilities in the global sales organization and in the supporting systems and structures. Following are five lessons that came out of our research.*
• Clarify the role of the global account management team-In many companies, global account management starts out as an exercise in internal coordination, a way of making salespeople in different parts of the company aware of what the others are doing. This is acceptahle as a first step, hut it is not enough. If the global account management program is worth establishing, it needs teeth, and that means having a global line of reporting as well as a local one. For example, in Hewlett-Packard's glohal account program, the Nortel Networks account manager reports to his sales manager in Canada and to the vice president of glohal accounts in Palo Alto. The value of this matrix-like arrangement is that when confiicts arise, the global account manager has someone back in HQ to help make his case. To be clear, there should be no hard rules about when the global wins out over the local. However, what should be avoided at all costs is a situation wherein the glohal account managers are simply slotted into the countryhased sales organization.
• Make incentive structure realistic-Global account management organizations sit alongside pre-existing national sales organizations rather than replacing them, and both units have a vital role in managing the account. Sales orders will still be booked through the local sales force, for example, and delivery and service are still a local joh. So who should get the sales commission when a global account places an order? We found this to be one of the thorniest problems facing vendors. In almost all cases we encountered, the organization was resigned to simply paying the commission twice: once to the global account managers based on global sales. and a local payment for each order taken. This expensive solution is tolerable only if the global account program results in increased business with the customer (i.e., if the strategy is right). While several companies had learned the dangers of splitting the incentives, none of those we researched had found a solution other than multiple rewards. The lesson is clear: even if the decisions are split between global and local units, the incentive structure must be replicated at both levels as if it were a purely local responsibility.
Pick the right global account managers, not just super-salesmen-Most global account managers are recruited from the sales organization, from positions such as regional sales manager or national sales manager in a small country. However, this approach is misguided because a global account is very different from a portfolio of regional or national accounts. True, many regional account managers do make good global account managers, but they have to learn some new skills to make the transition-internal coordination, taking a long-term perspective, nurturing the account not milking it, and so on. One company we studied took the opposite approach by appointing executives with senior line-management experience as global account managers. These individuals had all the necessary skills and were able to give the global account program its much-needed visibility.
Create a strong support network-Global account managers need a strong support network. They need mentors back at head office, they need information systems and communication materials to broadcast their activities, and they need regular meetings with each other at which they can compare notes and swap war stories. Indeed, our research shows that the strength of the internal support system was the single best predictor of a successful global account. Consider the case of Ericsson's enterprise networks business, which sells PBXs and office services to multinational customers. The global account managers are based in the home-countries of their customers, but back in Stockholm there is an extensive set of support activities-an order desk, marketing and customer relations, corporate network management, special project support, and internal network building. These are services that would be too expensive to spread all over the world. They also provide the visibility and political legitimacy that the global account managers need to get their work done.
Makes sure the customer relationship operates at more than one level-Support at the senior executive level usually gets established quite quickly. What usually gets neglected is the establishment of relationships underneath the global account manager. This is a serious problem, because the best-laid plans in the world are useless if your organization cannot deliver on them. Consider the comments of one local sales manager, on the efforts of his global account manager: "He negotiated a frame agreement with the customer, but then he did not follow through. I only found out about the agreement when I got a call from the customer. I was made to look like an idiot, because I didn't know what he was talking about." How do you avoid blunders like this? Ideally, you want to "mirror" your customer's organization from the global account executive right down to the local field and support team, but the reality is that except for the largest accounts (with their own dedicated people) you have to make do with your existing country-based sales organization. A popular way of solving the problem is to create two organizations within any country: a global customer unit that reports to the corporate locus of responsibility for that client, and the territorially defined national sales organization. This is not unlike the split between national accounts and sales districts, or between direct and distribution business. However, it creates enormous transition problems and cuts across the profit-and-loss responsibility and accountability given to most national subsidiaries.
Conclusion
Global account management represents an interesting new challenge to multinational corporations. Until now, globalization has occurred mainly in upstream activities such as production, R&D, and financing, where benefits of scale and control are most evident. Customer management-and the wider field of marketing-has until now generally been the responsibility of local subsidiaries, in order to maximize responsiveness to the heterogeneous demands of different markets. The structure of multinationals has reflected this configuration of activities. The subsidiary's responsibility for marketing and sales within its territory maximizes local responsiveness. By placing responsibility for revenue generation at the national level, this structure also provides a basis for the company's measurement and control systems.
The trend towards global customer management undermines much of this traditional logic and cuts against the traditional lines of organization in most large firms. Companies must think hard about whether global account management is right for them, because while there can be great benefits, there are also considerable downside risks in taking that route.
Companies tend to fall into three different camps in their approach to global account management. Some like 3M are ahead of their customers, typically because they are seeking to build strategic relationships through which new technologies and products can be developed. This group essentially has nothing to fear, because they are creating global accounts on their own terms. The second group is moving at the same speed as its customers. These companies are typically reacting to the initiatives of their customers but are quickly coming to grips with the challenge by putting programs in place to deliver on their customers' demands. For this group, the advice is to be selective. Global account management may be inevitable in their industry, but by figuring out their bargaining power and the degree of fit between their company and their leading customers, they can influence the way in which such accounts are established and which ones they want to focus their efforts on.
Finally, there is a group of companies that are lagging behind their customers, typically through reluctance to acknowledge the changes underway in their industry. Global account management is a real threat to these companies, because they either find themselves scrambling to deliver a global account program for which they are ill-equipped or find themselves losing business to better-organized competitors. This group must come to grips with the issues raised in this article. While global account relationships may well result in lower margins in key product areas, at least they will be able to go into them with a better understanding of the risks and what needs to be done to implement such relationships effectively. There is a methodological issue here, which is worth clarifying. Ideally, one would seek to understand the impact of global account management structures on the vendor by comparing a sample of "global accounts" with a matched sample of "non-global accounts." In practice, however, this is almost impossible to do. By definition, global accounts are created because they meet certain criteria in terms of importance or size that makes their comparison with non-global accounts highly suspect. Our attempts to study companies that had not introduced global account structures proved to be fruitless because there was no one responsible for the international customers in question, and they did not perceive the issue as important. Instead, we decided to undertake the comparison of global and nonglobal accounts by asking national sales managers, because they typically had to deal with some combination of the two. This set of findings comes from O. Toulan, J. Birkinshaw, and D. Arnold, "The Role of Interorganizational Fit in Global Account Management," research paper, 2001. This paper shows that significant predictors of account performance are the "fit" between vendor and customer on the strategic importance of the account, the level of executive support, the international marketing strategy adopted, and the international coordination of activities. Birkinshaw et al., op cit. Specifically, the performance of the global account is significantly associated with the functional scope of the account, the level of communication between the global account manager and counterparts in the two organizations, and the support systems provided by the vendor.
Notes

